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Introduction
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy
have become more essential to the individual; but modern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.1
On August 6, 2020, President Donald J. Trump issued two Executive
orders (the “Executive Orders,” or the “Orders”) targeting Chinese
technology companies TikTok and WeChat.2 TikTok, a video-sharing
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890).
2. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020) [hereinafter TikTok
Order] (ordering sale of TikTok); Exec. Order No. 13,943, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,641 (Aug. 6,
2020) [hereinafter WeChat Order] (blocking transactions with WeChat).
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mobile application, had seen a precipitous rise in popularity, primarily
among teenagers;3 before the August 2020 Orders, TikTok had been
downloaded 175 million times in the United States 4 and had 50 million
active users.5 WeChat, considered the “digital bedrock of daily life” in
China,6 is China’s largest messaging platform; 7 1.2 billion people use it
every month, 8 and there are an estimated 19 million users in the United
States alone. 9
The Orders prohibited transactions between persons subject to U.S.
jurisdiction and the two Chinese technology companies, 10 which rendered
the applications “essentially useless within the United States.”11 For
WeChat, this prevented U.S. users from using WeChat to send money to
family members, friends, and businesses in China.12 WeChat users in the
United States were also unable to download or update the app, which
prevented security updates and threatened to degrade the app’s utility over
time. 13 The TikTok Order gave TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance,
forty-five days to sell its subsidiary to a U.S. company, and if it failed to

3. Raymond Zhong & Sheera Frenkel, A Third of TikTok’s U.S. Users May Be 14 or
Under, Raising Safety Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/08/14/technology/tiktok-underage-users-ftc.html.
4. TikTok Order, supra note 2.
5. Brian X. Chen, What Is Happening with TikTok and WeChat as Trump Tries to Ban
Them?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/technology/
tiktok-wechat-ban.html.
6. Paul Mozur & Raymond Zhong, Targeting WeChat, Trump Takes Aim at China’s
Bridge to the World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/
business/trump-china-wechat-tiktok.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=
Article.
7. Aynne Kokas, China Already Has Your Data. Trump’s TikTok and WeChat Bans
Can’t Stop That, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2020/08/11/tiktok-wechat-bans-ineffective/.
8. Mozur & Zhong, supra note 6.
9. Kokas, supra note 7.
10. TikTok Order, supra note 2; WeChat Order, supra note 2.
11. Ana Swanson et al., Trump Administration to Ban TikTok and WeChat from U.S.
App Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/business/
trump-tik-tok-wechat-ban.html.
12. Shelly Banjo et al., Trump Backs Threats Against China with TikTok, WeChat Bans,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2020, 10:37 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-09-18/u-s-to-block-some-wechat-tiktok-transactions-as-of-sunday.
13. Id.
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reach a deal within forty-five days, the United States would ban the app
entirely.14
The Orders invoked national security as a rationale for blocking
transactions with TikTok and WeChat. Under Chinese law, the Chinese
government may compel companies in China to turn over users’ personal
data, and there has been growing U.S. concern that subsidiaries of Chinese
companies operating in the United States can transfer U.S. citizens’
personal data to parent companies subject to data requests from the Chinese
government.15 These concerns are warranted—TikTok’s privacy policy
states that the company “may share all of the information [it] collect[s] with
a parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of [its] corporate group.”16 As the
Orders highlighted, the national security concern is that these companies’
collection of “vast swaths” of personal information “threatens to allow the
Chinese Communist Party access to Americans’ personal and proprietary
information.”17 The Orders further explained that access to this data would
enable the Chinse government to track federal employees’ physical
movements, build dossiers of personal information to blackmail U.S.
citizens, and “conduct corporate espionage.” 18
President Trump issued the Orders targeting TikTok and WeChat19 under
the authority granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(“IEEPA”).20 IEEPA grants the President broad authority to regulate
commerce after declaring a “national emergency” to address “any unusual
and extraordinary threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States.”21 In this case, the President used IEEPA to
block transactions with the two Chinese technology companies; this was the
first time a President had invoked international emergency powers to
14. Rachel Lerman, ‘45 Days of Ambiguity’: What a U.S. TikTok Ban Could Mean for
Users and Employees, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/08/17/tiktok-ban-us-faq/.
15. Alex Schiller, WeChat and TikTok: Paper Tigers or Threats to U.S. National
Security?, CHINA FOCUS (Sept. 28, 2020), https://chinafocus.ucsd.edu/2020/09/28/wechatand-tiktok-paper-tigers-or-threats-to-u-s-national-security/.
16. Legal: Privacy Policy, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang
=en (June 2, 2021).
17. TikTok Order, supra note 2; WeChat Order, supra note 2.
18. TikTok Order, supra note 2; see also WeChat Order, supra note 2 (asserting that the
spread of mobile applications from Chinese companies “continues to threaten the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States”).
19. TikTok Order, supra note 2; WeChat Order, supra note 2.
20. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707.
21. Id. § 1701.
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address threats posed by popular consumer applications. 22 But a federal
court enjoined the WeChat Order on First Amendment grounds, 23 and
another federal court enjoined the TikTok Order based on an IEEPA
provision prohibiting the direct or indirect regulation of “personal
communication[s]” and the exchange of “informational materials.”24 In
June 2021, President Biden revoked the Orders entirely.25
The Executive Orders targeting TikTok and WeChat have highlighted
that IEEPA is too narrow a tool to address the national security challenges
that foreign technology companies pose to U.S. interests. And even if the
Orders had successfully blocked the Chinese government’s ability to access
U.S. citizens’ personal data through TikTok and WeChat, the Orders still
would not have meaningfully reduced the threat. First, TikTok and WeChat
are only two companies out of a multitude of foreign companies operating
in the United States.26 Other foreign-owned mobile applications have also
received scrutiny for their data collection practices and for threatening
national security, such as FaceApp, the age-enhancing selfie app that went
viral in 2019.27 Data harvesting is so pervasive28 that even if the Orders
were completely effective in protecting user data collected by TikTok and
WeChat, they would fail to address the more fundamental issues of data
security and privacy. In fact, the Orders were more likely to distract from

22. Lerman, supra note 14.
23. U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
24. TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92, 102, 115 (D.D.C. 2020) (alteration in
original).
25. Jeanne Whalen & Ellen Nakashima, Biden Revokes Trump’s TikTok and WeChat
Bans, but Sets Up a Security Review of Foreign-Owned Apps, WASH. POST (June 9, 2021,
1:33 PM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/06/09/tiktok-banrevoked-biden/.
26. See Kristen Bialik, Number of U.S. Workers Employed by Foreign-Owned
Companies Is on the Rise, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2017/12/14/number-of-u-s-workers-employed-by-foreign-owned-companiesis-on-the-rise/; Mary Hanbury, 11 American Companies That Are No Longer American,
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2018, 2:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/americancompanies-that-are-no-longer-american-2017-6.
27. Thomas Brewster, FaceApp: Is the Russian Face-Aging App a Danger to Your
Privacy?, FORBES (July 17, 2019, 7:20 AM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomas
brewster/2019/07/17/faceapp-is-the-russian-face-aging-app-a-danger-to-your-privacy/#64
aacfdc2755.
28. Madeline M. Cook, Comment, Bringing Down Big Data: A Call for Federal Data
Privacy Legislation, 74 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
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these issues and give a false sense of security to mobile app users. As one
scholar has said, the Orders were “merely window dressing.”29
Second, American companies also collect the “vast swaths”30 of data that
the Orders describe will fall into the hands of foreign governments. 31 From
browser extensions that collect information about every website you visit 32
to applications that harvest and sell your location data,33 American
companies arguably know you better than you know yourself. 34 And foreign
actors can still gain that information from American companies. For
example, a hack of the company Equifax in 2017 which the Department of
Justice attributed to four members of China’s military exposed the personal
data of up to 147.9 million U.S. consumers. 35
Invoking IEEPA to block foreign technology companies’ access to U.S.
user data on a case-by-case basis is wholly inadequate. Instead, the United
States should adopt a federal data privacy law that could more effectively
protect national security interests and safeguard data privacy. Part I of this
Comment examines the development of IEEPA and argues that it is an
inadequate tool for protecting national security and data privacy from
private sector applications that collect unprecedented amounts of personal
information. Part II then examines federal data privacy legislation as a
superior alternative to IEEPA for protecting national security and
safeguarding U.S. citizens’ personal information. This Part further looks to
the European Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and various
29. Kokas, supra note 7.
30. WeChat Order, supra note 2; Tiktok Order, supra note 2.
31. See Greg Bensinger, Trump Wants to Cripple TikTok and WeChat. Why?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/opinion/wechat-tiktoktrump.html (“There’s irony in the United States taking exception to TikTok and WeChat’s
data collection when our homegrown technology giants have built their empires on
hoovering up more and more of our personal information.”).
32. Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Found Your Data. It’s for Sale, WASH. POST (July 18, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/18/i-found-your-data-its-sale/.
33. Zack Whittaker, Data Brokers Track Everywhere You Go, but Their Days May Be
Numbered, TECHCRUNCH (July 9, 2020, 8:00 AM CDT), https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/09/
data-brokers-tracking/.
34. See, e.g., James Carmichael, Google Knows You Better Than You Know Yourself,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/
google-knows-you-better-than-you-know-yourself/378608/.
35. Yashaswini Swamynathan, Equifax Reveals Hack That Likely Exposed Data of 143
Million Customers, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2017, 3:49 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usequifax-cyber/equifax-says-hack-potentially-exposed-details-of-143-million-consumersidUSKCN1BI2VK; Brian Barrett, How 4 Chinese Hackers Allegedly Took Down Equifax,
WIRED (Feb. 10, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-hack-china/.
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approaches to data privacy that have been proposed in the United States.
Part II concludes that a federal data privacy law should incorporate the
GDPR’s regulation of cross-border data flows, which would both
ameliorate the risks that foreign technology companies pose to U.S.
national security interests and prevent other companies from compromising
U.S. citizens’ privacy interests as TikTok and WeChat have.
Ultimately, the TikTok and WeChat situation has demonstrated the
weakness of the United States’ data privacy framework and the pressing
need for lawmakers to enact legislation that will both protect national
security and safeguard the right to privacy. This Comment shows that
federal data privacy legislation, while not the panacea for national security
and data privacy challenges, would be a step in the right direction. Perhaps
the silver lining of the TikTok and WeChat debacle is that it will help shift
the United States toward a more comprehensive data privacy framework.
I. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
This Part assesses the adequacy of IEEPA as a tool to address the
national security issues that arise when a foreign government has the power
to acquire U.S. citizens’ personal data. Section I.A provides an overview of
IEEPA’s purpose and historical practice, demonstrating that Presidents
have invoked IEEPA in an increasingly broad array of situations. 36 Section
I.B then provides background on TikTok and WeChat and analyzes how the
Executive Orders illustrate IEEPA’s shortcomings in addressing threats that
foreign mobile applications pose to U.S. national security. This Part
concludes that (1) IEEPA is an unsuitable response to national security
issues posed by TikTok, WeChat, and other mobile applications that harvest
user data and that (2) federal data privacy legislation would better protect
national security.
A. History
In 1977, Congress enacted IEEPA as a response to the increasingly broad
use of another presidential emergency power: the Trading with the Enemy

36. While this broadened use has caused scholars to argue for amendments to IEEPA,
this is beyond this Comment’s scope. For a discussion of IEEPA reform, see Andrew Boyle,
Trump’s Latest Abuse of Emergency Powers Highlights a Dangerous Law in Need of
Change, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/trumps-latest-abuse-emergency-powers-highlights-dangerous-lawneed-change, and Jason Luong, Note, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (2000).
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Act of 1917 (“TWEA”).37 After the United States entered into World War I,
Congress enacted TWEA to grant the President broad authority to regulate
international transactions with foreign enemies. 38 TWEA section 5(b)
contained the heart of this authority, which “gave the President expansive
control over private international economic transactions.”39 While TWEA’s
original text only granted the President authority to regulate international
transactions in times of war, Congress amended section 5(b) in 1933 to
allow the President to regulate transactions in peacetime. 40 As amended, the
statute provided the following:
During time of war or during any other period of national
emergency declared by the President, the President may, through
any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate,
regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in
foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by
banking institutions as defined by the President . . . .41
By the Cold War, TWEA had become a popular economic sanctions tool
in foreign policy.42 In the 1970s, however, Congress sought to curtail what
it viewed as “extensive use by Presidents of emergency authority . . . to
regulate both domestic and international economic transactions unrelated to
a declared state of emergency.”43
IEEPA was a response to this extensive use. 44 Congress intended to limit
the President’s powers during peacetime, which had become “essentially an
unlimited grant of authority [under TWEA],” to be limited to times of
national emergency.45 Congress thus modified TWEA section 5(b) to allow
for the regulation of international transactions only in times of war and
authorized the President to regulate international transactions in peacetime

37. Note, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional
Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1102 (1983).
38. CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT : ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 3–4 (2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45618.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5.
41. H.R. 1491, 73d Cong. (1933) (emphasis added) (enacted).
42. CASEY ET AL., supra note 38, at, at 6.
43. S. REP. NO. 95-466, at 2 (1977).
44. Id. at 2, 4.
45. H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 7 (1977).
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under IEEPA. 46 But to regulate transactions under IEEPA, the President
must first declare a national emergency under the National Emergencies
Act of 1976 (“NEA”). 47 A national emergency was to be “rare and brief”
and should not “be equated with normal, ongoing problems.” 48 Congress
further emphasized that IEEPA “should be available only in true
emergencies.”49 And while Congress did not define a “true emergency,”
IEEPA’s text provides that any emergency must relate to an “unusual or
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States.”50
NEA also provided procedural safeguards for declaring a national
emergency.51 These safeguards required the President to consult with
Congress before declaring a national emergency, terminated the national
emergency after one year unless the President renewed it, and empowered
Congress to override the President’s declaration of a national emergency
through a concurrent resolution. 52
Furthermore, IEEPA provided for several exceptions to the President’s
authority to regulate transactions, including a prohibition on directly or
indirectly regulating the following:
●

“personal communication[s]” that do not “involve a transfer of
anything of value”; 53

●

donations “intended to be used to relieve human suffering”; 54 or

●

the importation of “information or informational materials,
including but not limited to, publications, films, posters,

46. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 10
(2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf.
47. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 6.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 12.
50. 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
51. HALCHIN, supra note 46, at 11.
52. Id. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which invalidated concurrent resolutions, Congress amended
the NEA to require a joint resolution to override a national emergency. HALCHIN, supra note
46, at 11. This had the effect of making any override of a national emergency declaration
extremely unlikely since the President would need to sign off on the joint resolution.
53. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1).
54. Id. § 1702(b)(2).
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phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes,
compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds.”55
Overall, Congress intended IEEPA to strike a balance between “executive
flexibility” in addressing foreign threats with “political accountability.” 56
Although Congress enacted IEEPA to reign in executive declarations of
national emergencies, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in an increasingly
broad array of situations, and the declared national emergencies have been
anything but “rare and brief.”57 Presidents have invoked IEEPA fifty-nine
times since 1977, and the average length of a national emergency is more
than nine years.58 The first national emergency was declared in 1979 in
relation to the Iranian hostage crisis, and that national emergency is still in
effect.59 At the same time, IEEPA’s emergency renewals have become a
“pro-forma exercise,”60 and a declaration of national emergency needs only
contain “the magic words.”61 And while IEEPA was initially limited by
specific geographical targets, it has expanded to address threats that
transcend geography, such as global terrorism, cyberattacks, and drug
trafficking. 62
There is of course a benefit to allowing a President broad discretion in
responding to a national security threat.63 The President must be capable of
declaring a national emergency (if one exists) and taking necessary
measures to eliminate it. But the increasingly routine and expansive uses of
IEEPA risk making IEEPA itself a barrier to achieving a more sustainable
and comprehensive response to national security threats.

55. Id. § 1702(b)(3).
56. Note, supra note 37, at 1104.
57. CASEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 17.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 18–19.
60. Peter Harrell, The Right Way to Reform the U.S. President’s International
Emergency Powers, JUST SEC. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69388/theright-way-to-reform-the-u-s-presidents-international-emergency-powers/
(discussing
proposals for procedural reform to IEEPA in light of its expanded use).
61. What a President Can Do Under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (May 31, 2019, 6:11 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/
2019/05/31/728754901/what-a-president-can-do-under-the-international-emergencyeconomic-powers-act.
62. Id.; CASEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 17.
63. See generally Note, supra note 37, for a discussion of the benefits of broad
executive authority under IEEPA.
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B. The 2020 Executive Orders Targeting TikTok and WeChat
In one respect, the TikTok and WeChat Orders are not unique; they
reflect the expanding use of IEEPA to address various threats to national
security. They are different, however, in that they represent the first uses of
IEEPA to target popular mobile phone applications.64 Ultimately, both
Orders faced constitutional challenges and federal courts enjoined their
enforcement.65 This Section first demonstrates that the threat to national
security far exceeds TikTok and WeChat. This Section then examines how
the legal challenges to the TikTok and WeChat Orders illustrate why
IEEPA is incapable of addressing the threats that mobile applications pose
to national security.
1. TikTok and WeChat
With more than 180 million downloads in the United States, TikTok’s
sudden rise in popularity perhaps represents the first time a foreigndeveloped mobile application has garnered such a devoted user base. 66 But
it will not be the last.67
U.S. national security concerns stemmed from TikTok’s corporate
ownership structure, which made U.S. user data susceptible to access by the
Chinese government. TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, is a Chinese
tech company. 68 In 2016, ByteDance launched the China-based video
application Douyin, and within a year, Douyin had 100 million users and
one billion daily video views. 69 The following year, ByteDance began to
64. See Elizabeth Goitein, How Congress Is Pushing Back Against Trump’s
Unprecedented Use of Emergency Powers, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2020, 6:00 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/25/how-congress-is-pushing-backagainst-trumps-unprecedented-use-emergency-powers/.
65. TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92, 100, 115 (D.D.C. 2020); U.S. WeChat
Users All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912, 916, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
66. See Katy Stech Ferek & Liza Lin, TikTok Files Suit Challenging U.S. Ban, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2020, 3:24 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-to-file-suitchallenging-u-s-ban-11598281193.
67. David E. Sanger, TikTok Deal Exposes a Security Gap, and a Missing China
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/20/us/politics/
tiktok-trump-national-security.html (“The longer-run issue, however, is that there will be
more TikToks, companies around the world that develop apps that Americans love—or see
as a hedge against their own government.”).
68. Paige Leskin, Inside the Rise of TikTok, the Viral Video-Sharing App Wildly
Popular with Teens and Loathed by the Trump Administration, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2020,
4:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-app-online-website-video-sharing-20197.
69. Id.
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expand Douyin internationally under the name TikTok. 70 Meanwhile, in the
United States, the short-form video application Musical.ly was gaining
popularity among teenagers.71 In November 2017, ByteDance purchased
Musical.ly, and in 2018, ByteDance merged Musical.ly with TikTok. 72
National security concerns led to an investigation of the merger by the
Department of the Treasury’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States,73 which reviews transactions involving foreign investment in
the United States to determine whether they present a national security
risk.74 Following the Committee’s investigation, TikTok took numerous
steps to assuage national security concerns, such as appointing an exDisney executive as its chief executive officer, launching a content advisory
council to lead its policy changes, and establishing a transparency center to
evaluate its data privacy and security practices. 75 But in the eyes of
lawmakers and the President, these steps were inadequate to cure the
national security threat posed by TikTok’s connection to China. 76
Most of the U.S. government’s concerns relate to TikTok’s ownership by
ByteDance because it is subject to China’s far-reaching cybersecurity law. 77
Under China’s cybersecurity law, Chinese companies have broad
obligations to assist the government in investigating political and
ideological threats to the country.78 While TikTok has publicly stated that it
would refuse to cooperate with a request from the Chinese government to
hand over U.S. users’ personal data,79 TikTok’s privacy policy reveals that
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T
TREAS.,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreigninvestment-in-the-united-states-cfius (last visited Feb 13, 2021).
74. Greg Roumeliotis et al., Exclusive: U.S. Opens National Security Investigation into
TikTok - Sources, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2019, 10:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ustiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opens-national-security-investigation-into-tiktoksources-idUSKBN1XB4IL.
75. Leskin, supra note 68.
76. Id.
77. Jacob Helberg, Silicon Valley Can’t Be Neutral in the U.S.-China Cold War,
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 22, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/22/zoomchina-us-cold-war-unsafe/.
78. Id.
79. Robert McMillan et al., TikTok User Data: What Does the App Collect and Why Are
U.S. Authorities Concerned?, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
tiktok-user-data-what-does-the-app-collect-and-why-are-u-s-authorities-concerned-11594
157084.
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it may share user data with “corporate affiliates” and “third-party business
partners.”80 Thus, even if TikTok refused a direct request from the Chinese
government, U.S. lawmakers still fear that the Chinese government could
wield its cybersecurity law to force “corporate affiliates,” namely
ByteDance, to comply with data requests. 81 TikTok has also allegedly
exfiltrated facial recognition information from California to China,82 and
policy analysts fear that TikTok’s algorithms favor pro-China content.83 But
both security experts and lawmakers are most concerned about TikTok’s
data collection practices and its ties to ByteDance, Tiktok’s China-based
parent company.84
Many of these same concerns pertain to WeChat. WeChat is known as
the largest messaging platform in China, but it is much more than that:
WeChat is an “all-purpose” app through which over a billion people shop,
pay bills, read the news, and share photos.85 For friends and loved ones in
the United States, WeChat is one of the primary “digital bridges” that
connects them with others in China.86 But concerns of censorship,
surveillance, and intimidation by the Chinese government ultimately led
President Trump to issue the WeChat Order on August 6, 2020, prohibiting
transactions through WeChat.87
One reason why the Executive Orders cannot meaningfully contribute to
national security is that TikTok and WeChat are far from the only two
companies with Chinese corporate affiliates operating in the United
States.88 And China is not the only country that may pose a threat to U.S.
consumers’ data privacy and security. 89 Furthermore, U.S. companies
80. Bobby Allyn, Class-Action Lawsuit Claims TikTok Steals Kids’ Data and Sends It
to China, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, (Aug. 4, 2020, 1:39 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/
2020/08/04/898836158/class-action-lawsuit-claims-tiktok-steals-kids-data-and-sends-it-tochina.
81. Ferek & Lin, supra note 66.
82. Kokas, supra note 7.
83. Helberg, supra note 77.
84. Ferek & Lin, supra note 66.
85. Mozur & Zhong, supra note 6.
86. Id.
87. WeChat Order, supra note 2; Paul Mozur, Forget TikTok. China’s Powerhouse App
Is WeChat, and Its Power Is Sweeping, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/09/04/technology/wechat-china-united-states.html.
88. See Chinese Investment in the United States Database, PUB. CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/article/chinese-investment-in-the-united-states-database/ (last visited
Dec. 19, 2021).
89. See Tiffany C. Li, FaceApp Makes Today’s Privacy Laws Look Antiquated,
ATLANTIC (July 20, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/faceapp-
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collect the same data as TikTok and WeChat, if not more. 90 U.S.
companies’ data collection practices present significant privacy concerns to
U.S. users because they do not adequately protect against foreign
governments’ access to sensitive user data through cyberattacks:
“Combined with data gathered through hacks of Equifax, Marriott, Anthem
and the Office of Personal Management, the Chinese government has a
treasure trove of information to support intelligence-gathering activities for
decades to come, regardless of [the TikTok and WeChat] bans.”91 The fact
that President Trump invoked IEEPA to target TikTok and WeChat while
the government failed to address U.S. companies’ collection of user data
suggests that “targeting a few big names merely distracts from the severity
of the problem”92 because these types of hacks will continue regardless of
targeted bans on specific tech companies. 93
Additionally, one of the primary concerns that the Executive Orders
described is the threat that the Chinese government will wage
disinformation campaigns through both TikTok and WeChat. Both Orders
stated that the Chinese tech companies “reportedly censor[] content that the
Chinese Communist Party deems politically sensitive . . . [and] may also be
used for disinformation campaigns that benefit the Chinese Communist
Party.”94 For example, WeChat has censored content related to human
rights activists, religious groups, and as early as January 2020, key words
pertaining to COVID-19. 95 Similarly, TikTok’s algorithm has been accused
of favoring pro-China content in the United States. 96 Although TikTok now
allows political speech—unless the political speech contains “hate

reveals-huge-holes-todays-privacy-laws/594358/ (discussing privacy threats posed by the
Russian-developed FaceApp among others).
90. Allyn, supra note 80 (“Experts said most smartphone apps collect and store just as
much—or more—data as TikTok does.”).
91. Kokas, supra note 7.
92. Id.
93. See generally Graham Webster, App Bans Won’t Make US Security Risks
Disappear, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/09/
21/1008620/wechat-tiktok-ban-china-us-security-policy-opinion/.
94. TikTok Order, supra note 2; WeChat Order, supra note 2.
95. Coronavirus: Chinese App WeChat Censored Virus Content Since 1 Jan, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51732042; Eva Xiao,
China’s WeChat Monitors Foreign Users to Refine Censorship at Home, WALL ST. J. (May
8, 2020, 3:32 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-wechat-monitors-foreign-usersto-refine-censorship-at-home-11588852802.
96. Helberg, supra note 77.
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speech”—it had previously censored political content to keep the videosharing platform “as positive as possible.” 97
As the 2016 presidential election illustrated, 98 the threat posed by foreign
disinformation campaigns is a topic of pressing importance that demands
further scrutiny.99 In the Internet’s marketplace of ideas, there is an endless
supply of foreign and domestic speech, and the source is often
indiscernible. 100 But even if federal courts had ultimately upheld the Orders,
it is unlikely that this would have made a cognizable difference in reducing
the threat of Chinese disinformation campaigns in the United States. First,
compared to Facebook and Twitter—where disinformation campaigns have
the highest potential for success because of the platforms’ reach—WeChat
users constitute a small percentage of the population. Moreover, banning
WeChat would be reminiscent of China’s own blocking of websites such as
Facebook, Twitter, and Google, and policy experts have questioned whether
U.S. data security strategy should mirror China’s censorship practices. 101
Second, disinformation campaigns waged on Facebook and Twitter suggest
that the threat of disinformation will remain on TikTok regardless of
whether it is owned by a U.S. or foreign company.
The United States certainly has a compelling interest in protecting
national security, 102 and perhaps TikTok and WeChat do pose such a threat.
But even if they do, the Executive Orders are incapable of meaningfully
changing how companies harvest and store user data. TikTok and WeChat
are only two of the many companies in the United States with potential ties
to foreign governments, and U.S. companies have also failed to safeguard
user data. Consequently, invoking IEEPA to target foreign mobile
applications on a case-by-case will do little to protect national security and
97. Georgia Wells et al., TikTok, Once an Oasis of Inoffensive Fun, Ventures Warily
into Politics, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2020, 12:04 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktokventures-warily-into-politicsand-finds-complications-11594224268.
98. See, e.g., Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269,
270–71 (2018).
99. See id. at 302–09 for a discussion of the First Amendment right to receive foreign
speech and disinformation’s impact on the marketplace of ideas.
100. See generally id. at 316–17 (discussing legislative and educational efforts to prevent
the spread of misinformation and to require disclosures of the interested parties in online
transactions and advertisements).
101. See Louise Matsakis, Does TikTok Really Pose a Risk to US National Security?,
WIRED (July 17, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/tiktok-ban-us-nationalsecurity-risk/ (“Outlawing TikTok would also mean the US would be participating in the
same Chinese-style internet sovereignty tactics it has long criticized . . . .”).
102. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
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U.S. citizens’ personal information. The successful legal challenges to the
Orders further illustrate IEEPA’s ill-fit use against foreign mobile
applications.
2. Legal Challenges
In addition to IEEPA’s inability to meaningfully reduce foreign mobile
applications’ threat to national security, executive orders targeting mobile
applications pursuant to IEEPA are unlikely to survive legal challenges.
Federal courts have enjoined the enforcement of both Orders, finding merit
to challenges based on the First Amendment and an IEEPA provision
banning the direct or indirect regulation of “personal communication[s]”
and the exchange of “informational materials.”103
In granting TikTok’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia recognized that the TikTok
Order likely exceeded the President’s IEEPA powers because it might have
indirectly regulated “personal communication[s]” or the exchange of
“information or informational materials.” 104 IEEPA sections 1702(b)(1) and
1702(b)(3) specifically restrict direct or indirect regulation of these
exchanges.105 While the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
was not a ruling on the merits, the challenge would likely apply to any use
of IEEPA to target a popular tech company through which users exchange
messages or share content.
The U.S. WeChat Users Alliance (the plaintiff that challenged the
WeChat Order) also obtained a preliminary injunction, but on different
grounds. In granting the preliminary injunction, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California concluded that the U.S. WeChat Users
Alliance presented “serious questions going to the merits of their First
Amendment claim” because the government’s measures “effectively
eliminate[d] the plaintiffs’ key platform for communication, slow[ed] or
eliminate[d] discourse, and [was] the equivalent of censorship of speech or
a prior restraint on it.”106 The court noted that there is not another viable
platform because WeChat is the only option for many Chinese speakers
with limited English proficiency. 107

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

50 U.S.C. § 1701.
TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73, 83 (D.D.C. 2020).
Id. at 81, 83.
U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912, 926 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
Id. at 927.
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The court further concluded that even if the Order were a content-neutral
time-place-or-manner restriction, it would likely fail even under
intermediate scrutiny. 108 A content-neutral restriction must be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, be “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech,” and provide “ample
alternative channels for communication.” 109 The regulation does not need to
be the least restrictive means, “[b]ut the government still may not regulate
expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on
speech does not serve to advance its goals.”110 In granting the preliminary
injunction, the district court concluded that while the government’s
national-security interest was significant, the Order was likely not narrowly
tailored because a substantial portion of the restriction burdened speech in a
way that might not have advanced the government’s interest.111 Rather than
implementing an all-out ban, the government could have burdened
substantially less speech by prohibiting WeChat usage on government
devices or “taking other steps to address data security.”112
These legal challenges demonstrate that IEEPA cannot be used as a tool
to ban foreign mobile applications in the United States. But even if courts
had ultimately upheld the Orders, the threat to national security will persist
until there is a more comprehensive and nuanced approach to protecting
data privacy.
II. Federal Data Privacy Legislation Is a Superior Alternative to IEEPA
The threat posed by foreign governments’ access to consumers’ personal
data is heightened by the business model that makes it possible:
advertisement-based websites and applications that extract and monetize
personal data.113 This personal data includes information such as page
views, searches, physical locations, browsing history, device IDs, and user
emails.114 Many mobile applications do not charge a user fee, but these
services are not really free: “We don’t pay for the product because we are
108. Id. at 927–28.
109. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
110. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S 464, 486 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
111. U.S. WeChat Users All., 488 F. Supp. 3d at 927.
112. Id.
113. See generally Cook, supra note 28.
114. See Evelyn Mary Aswad, Losing the Freedom to Be Human, 52 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 306, 318–19 (2020).
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the product.”115 While individual pieces of data may be “harmless enough
on [their] own,” they are “carefully assembled, synthesized, traded, and
sold.”116 As Apple CEO Tim Cook has warned, “This is surveillance.” 117
The routine and pervasive practice of data harvesting by technology
companies has been increasingly recognized as an incursion into people’s
right to privacy118 and even an interference with people’s right to hold
opinions without interference. 119
Part II discusses the pressing need for federal data privacy legislation.
While enacting data privacy legislation would not eliminate national
security issues posed by foreign mobile applications operating in the United
States, it would be an important step towards safeguarding privacy and
protecting national security interests. Section II.A. begins by situating data
privacy in the context of international human rights. Section II.B then
examines data privacy bills before the 117th Congress and recommends
improvements. Any of these bills, several of which share similarities with
the European GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act, would be a
monumental step forward for the United States in protecting user data. But
each bill omits key features that would better safeguard U.S. citizens’ right
to privacy and protect national security, most notably a provision that
would regulate international data transfers.
A. Privacy Is an Internationally Recognized Human Right
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that due process provides for an
individual’s right to privacy in certain contexts. 120 But because the
115. Geoffrey A. Fowler, What If We Paid for Facebook—Instead of Letting It Spy on Us
for Free?, WASH. POST (April 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2018/04/05/what-if-we-paid-for-facebook-instead-of-letting-it-spy-on-us-forfree/.
116. Sam Schechner & Emre Peker, Apple CEO Condemns ‘Data-Industrial Complex’,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2018, 11:41 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-ceo-timcook-calls-for-comprehensive-u-s-privacy-law-1540375675.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation,
9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355 (2015); Kalinda Basho, Comment, The Licensing of Our
Personal Information: Is It a Solution to Internet Privacy?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1507 (2000).
119. Aswad, supra note 114, at 363.
120. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding
a right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (finding that the right to privacy as derived from the Fourteenth Amendment
encompasses a woman’s right to an abortion); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment extends the right of privacy to private sexual
relationships).
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extraction and monetization of personal data is a global practice, this
Comment examines data privacy in the context of existing international
human rights frameworks. Furthermore, the United States has endorsed a
voluntary framework, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (“UNGPs”), which provides minimum standards for companies that
face human rights issues and calls on governments to take appropriate
legislative steps to protect internationally recognized human rights as
enshrined in U.N. instruments. 121
In the U.N. human rights system, the right to privacy is commemorated
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). The U.N.
General Assembly unanimously adopted the UDHR in 1948 in pursuit of
establishing an “international Bill of Rights.”122 While not legally binding,
the UDHR provided a framework for understanding internationally
recognized human rights, and through its thirty articles, the UDHR laid a
foundation for future U.N. documents and international human rights
treaties. 123
Article 12 of the UDHR provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”124 The UDHR
also contains a general limitations clause that applies to each right:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in
a democratic society.125

121. Aswad, supra note 114, at 312–13; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. GOVERNMENT
APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2013), https://kr.usembassy.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/75/2017/04/dwoa_USG-Approach-on-Business-and-Human-RightsupdatedJune2013.pdf (“The U.S. government encourages stakeholders to treat the Guiding
Principles as a ‘floor’ rather than a ‘ceiling’ for addressing issues of business and human
rights, and to recognize that implementing the Guiding Principles should be a continuous
process.”).
122. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 401–02 (3d ed. 2018).
123. Id. at 402.
124. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10,
1948).
125. Id. art. 29(2).
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But because the UDHR is not legally binding, the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights set out to conclude a legally binding treaty that would
incorporate the UDHR’s principles. 126 This led to the adoption of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).127 The
ICCPR entered into force in 1976, and as of 2022, the treaty has 173 state
parties, including the United States.128
Similar to article 12 of the UDHR, article 17 of the ICCPR addresses the
right to privacy. Specifically, it provides that
[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation [and that]
[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.129
Furthermore, state parties to the ICCPR “undertake[] to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within [their] territory and subject to [their]
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”130
Certainly, the UDHR and ICCPR did not envision the rise of twentieth
century data collection practices and the issues they pose, let alone the
national security and privacy threats posed by mobile application
companies such as TikTok and WeChat. And countries have applied the
UDHR and ICCPR’s right to privacy in different ways. 131 But while the
UDHR and the ICCPR did not envision the pervasive harvesting and
monetization of personal data, recent U.N. resolutions have demonstrated
that the right to privacy enshrined in both the UDHR and ICCPR applies to
digital privacy.132 These resolutions have “confirm[ed] the tendency to
anchor data protection in the context of international human rights law.”133
126. MURPHY, supra note 122, at 404.
127. Id.
128. Aswad, supra note 114, at 327; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
129. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17(1)–(2), opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). It is
important to note that not all government invasions of privacy would violate ICCPR article
19. To violate the article, the invasion of privacy must either be “arbitrary” or “unlawful.”
Id.
130. Id. art. 2(1).
131. See Joshua Blume, Note, A Contextual Extraterritoriality Analysis of the DPIA and
DPO Provisions in the GDPR, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1425, 1428 (2018).
132. U.N. Resolution 68/167 provides in part:
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While the UDHR and treaties such as the ICCPR generally apply to
nation-states, there is another international framework that applies to
private companies. The United States has endorsed this framework—the
UNGPs—describing it “as a minimum standard for American
companies.”134 The UNGPs call for companies to respect human rights as
memorialized in U.N. instruments, including the UDHR and ICCPR.135 And
as U.N. developments have shown, the concept of privacy in the UDHR
and ICCPR includes data privacy.136
The UNGPs also require governments to take appropriate legislative
steps to protect human rights. Principle 1 of the UNGPs provides that
governments “must protect against human rights abuse” by corporations
within their territory.137 This protection “requires taking appropriate steps to
prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective
policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.” 138 But when it comes to
regulating corporate abuse of the right to data privacy, U.S. legislation has
“significantly lagged behind” the rest of the world. 139 In fact, the United
States is one of the only economically developed nations without a

[T]he rapid pace of technological development enables individuals all over the
world to use new information and communication technologies and at the same
time enhances the capacity of governments, companies and individuals to
undertake surveillance, interception and data collection, which may violate or
abuse human rights, in particular the right to privacy, as set out in article 12 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and is therefore an issue of increasing
concern . . . .
G.A. Res. 68/167 at pmbl. (Dec. 18, 2013).
133. Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Human Rights Extraterritoriality: The Right to
Privacy and National Security Surveillance (G.W. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Paper
No. 2016-67), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3043771.
134. Aswad, supra note 114, at 312.
135. Id. at 313 n.12; U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, princ. 12, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter
UNGPs].
136. G.A. Res. 68/167132.
137. UNGPs, supra note 135, at princ. 1.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Samer Kamal, Where Does the U.S. Rank in the Global Data Privacy Landscape?,
CPO MAG. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/where-does-the-us-rank-in-the-global-data-privacy-landscape/.
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comprehensive national consumer data privacy law. 140 The lack of a
national data privacy law “has left Americans at the mercy of digital
services that have every reason to exploit our personal information and little
incentive to safeguard it.”141
In addition to requiring governments to take appropriate legislative
action to protect human rights, the UNGPs also state that companies have a
responsibility to respect human rights, including through conducting human
rights due diligence assessments.142 This means companies should “assess[]
actual and potential human rights impacts, integrat[e] and act[] upon the
findings, track[] responses, and communicat[e] how impacts are
addressed.”143 But the technology companies whose business models are
based on harvesting and monetizing personal information144 do not conduct
human rights impact assessments.145 Perhaps if technology companies had
implemented the UNGPs’ human rights due diligence requirement before
building business models based on harvesting personal data, the right to
privacy would be better respected in the digital sphere today.
The UNGPs should both compel and inform the creation of a national
consumer data privacy law because the UNGPs call on governments to take
appropriate legislative steps to protect human rights, and U.S. companies
have not respected the right to data privacy or conducted human rights due
diligence. Section II.B compares existing international and state data
privacy frameworks to four data privacy bills that are before the 117th
Congress, recommending further measures that a federal data privacy law
should include to better safeguard U.S. citizens’ personal information and
protect national security.
B. Federal Data Privacy Legislation Will Better Safeguard Human Rights
and National Security
Federal data privacy legislation would not only protect U.S. citizens’
right to data privacy but also benefit the U.S. government’s national

140. See generally Natasha Singer, The Government Protects Our Food and Cars. Why
Not Our Data?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/sundayreview/data-protection-privacy.html (stating that instead of a national data privacy law,
“Americans have to rely on the Federal Trade Commission, an overstretched agency with
limited powers, to police privacy as a side hustle”).
141. Id.
142. UNGPs, supra note 135, at princ. 17–21.
143. Id. at princ. 17.
144. Aswad, supra note 114, at 310.
145. Id. at 366.
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security interests.146 Properly designed national legislation would provide
“security authorities with the information they need to feel confident that
specific apps do not pose a privacy or security risk” and “help ensure that
freedom of expression and privacy are honored across our connected
lives.”147 As awareness of the national security risks posed by foreign
actors’ access to U.S. citizens’ data has grown, calls for a federal data
privacy bill have received more bipartisan support.148 And Chinese
companies’ increased access to the U.S. market—most vividly illustrated
by TikTok’s precipitous rise in popularity—has intensified the desire to
pass federal legislation.149
While passing a federal data privacy law would not eliminate all threats
related to data privacy and national security, 150 it would be a meaningful
step in the right direction for numerous reasons. For example, a national
law would harmonize the existing patchwork of state consumer privacy
laws.151 The existing patchwork of state laws adds compliance costs and
constraints on operability across state lines, making U.S. companies less
competitive on a global scale152 while failing to adequately protect
consumers or address national security threats. 153 A federal data privacy law
146. See, e.g., Claudia Biancotti, For the United States, More Digital Privacy Would
Mean More National Security, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON.: REALTIME ECON. ISSUES
WATCH (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issueswatch/united-states-more-digital-privacy-would-mean-more-national (“Most worries about
foreign entities prying into American lives could be assuaged by strengthening everyday
digital rights, a move with benefits beyond security.”); Carrie Cordero, The National
Security Imperative of Protecting User Data, CTR. FOR NEW AM. SEC. (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/the-national-security-imperative-ofprotecting-user-data (“Policy debates over national security legal authorities, like
surveillance, have traditionally pitted those favoring national security equities against those
favoring privacy equities. The choice is a false one.”).
147. Webster, supra note 93.
148. Robert D. Williams, To Enhance Data Security, Federal Privacy Legislation Is Just
a Start, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHSTREAM (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
techstream/to-enhance-data-security-federal-privacy-legislation-is-just-a-start/.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See WILSON C. FREEMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10213, CALIFORNIA DREAMIN’ OF
PRIVACY REGULATION : THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT AND CONGRESS 1 (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10213.pdf.
152. Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, FTC, A Defining Moment for Privacy: The Time Is
Ripe for Federal Privacy Legislation, Remarks at the Future of Privacy Forum 7–8 (Feb. 6,
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1566337/commission
er_wilson_privacy_forum_speech_02-06-2020.pdf.
153. Id. at 7.
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would create a unified, predictable framework for businesses operating in
the U.S. market. Additionally, a federal data privacy law could address
discrimination risks posed by the aggregation and use of consumer
profiles,154 enshrine “baseline privacy as a core U.S. value,” 155 and promote
innovation through “clearly defined and consistently applied rules.” 156
But there are numerous questions surrounding the scope of a federal data
privacy law, primarily related to whether it would preempt existing state
laws, whether it would provide a private right of action, and how it would
be enforced. 157 Policy analysts have challenged the implementation of a
federal data privacy law on economic grounds. 158 And while it is important
to include technology companies in the debate, any legislation will likely
receive opposition from powerful stakeholders whose business models
revolve around harvesting user data.159 So, rather than adding to the debate
over preemption, a private right of action, and enforcement, this section
examines key features of the GDPR and U.S. state data privacy approaches
that should inform a federal law. In particular, a federal law should
incorporate the strong data privacy rights of the GDPR and U.S. state laws,
as well as elements of the GDPR’s regulation of cross-border data transfers.

154. Peter M. Lefkowitz, Why America Needs a Thoughtful Federal Privacy Law, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/opinion/congress-privacylaw.html.
155. Jessica Rich, After 20 Years of Debate, It’s Time for Congress to Finally Pass a
Baseline Privacy Law, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/01/14/after-20-years-of-debate-its-time-for-congress-tofinally-pass-a-baseline-privacy-law/.
156. Harper Neidig, 51 Major CEOs Ask Congress for Federal Privacy Law Blocking
State Rules, HILL (Sept. 10, 2019, 2:23 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/policy/
technology/460737-51-major-ceos-urge-congress-to-pass-privacy-law-blocking-state-data.
157. STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11207, DATA
PROTECTION AND PRIVACY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/IF/IF11207.
158. ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE COSTS
OF AN UNNECESSARILY STRINGENT FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 1 (Aug. 2019),
https://itif.org/sites/default/files/2019-cost-data-privacy-law.pdf.
159. Webster, supra note 93 (“There is well-organized opposition to enacting serious
privacy rules in the United States, and those opponents can far outspend all existing efforts
to make real progress on this issue.”).
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1. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
The GDPR took effect on May 25, 2018, and has since fueled debate
over U.S. data privacy policies.160 Through the GDPR, the EU provides
“the world’s toughest rules to protect people’s online data” and is a “sharp
divergence from the United States, which has taken little action over the
years in regulating the tech industry.” 161 The law is grounded in the EU’s
stance that privacy of communications and personal data is a fundamental
human right.162
The GDPR limits how businesses can process personal data and has an
“aggressive extraterritorial scope.” 163 It applies to any business that
processes personal data of individuals in the EU, 164 regardless of the
business’s location or the individual’s country of citizenship.165 “Personal
data” is broadly defined as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person,” and an “identifiable natural person” is defined
as one who can be directly or indirectly identified “by reference to an
identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological,
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural
person.”166
The GDPR also created data protection requirements that give
individuals in the EU certain rights related to how companies process their
personal data. These rights include the following:
●

the “right to be forgotten,” which allows individuals to request
companies delete all their personal data;

160. RACHEL F. FEFER & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10896, EU DATA
PROTECTION RULES AND U.S. IMPLICATIONS (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10896.pdf.
161. Adam Satariano, G.D.P.R., a New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s Leading
Tech Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/
technology/europe-gdpr-privacy.html.
162. FEFER & ARCHICK, supra note 160; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1
[hereinafter GDPR] (“The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of
personal data is a fundamental right.”).
163. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard,
71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 378 (2019).
164. Id. at 377.
165. Stuart L. Pardau, The California Consumer Privacy Act: Towards A European-Style
Privacy Regime in the United States?, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 68, 86 n.100 (2018).
166. GDPR, supra note 162, art. 4(1).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/7

2022]

COMMENTS

487

●

the “right to object,” which allows individuals to object to
certain uses of their personal data;

●

the “right to rectification,” which allows individuals to request
companies correct incorrect or incomplete personal data;

●

the “right of portability,” which allows individuals to request
companies transfer their personal data to another company;

●

the “right of access,” which allows individuals to learn what
personal data companies have collected and how companies use
that data; and

●

the “right to be notified,” which requires companies to notify
individuals of a breach within seventy-two hours of gaining
knowledge of the breach.167

In addition to providing these rights to individuals in the EU, the GDPR
regulates the flow of personal data from the EU to third countries (any
country outside the EU and the European Economic Area) and international
organizations.168 Under the GDPR, businesses may transfer personal data to
third countries or international organizations that provide adequate
protection to that data.169 The European Commission, the EU’s primary
executive body, is tasked with making these “adequacy decisions”
concerning third countries and international organizations’ level of data
protection.170 In determining whether a third country or international
organization provides adequate protection, the Commission considers
various factors:
the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, relevant legislation, . . . the access of public
authorities to personal data, . . . data protection rules, . . . rules
for the onward transfer of personal data to another third country
or international organisation . . . as well as effective and
enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and
167. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 163, at 377.
168. GDPR, supra note 162, art. 44; Data Transfer to Third Countries, GDPR INFORMER
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://gdprinformer.com/gdpr-articles/data-transfers-third-countries.
169. Id.
170. W. Gregory Voss, Cross-Border Data Flow, the GDPR, and Data Governance, 29
WASH. INT’L L.J. 485, 507 (2020); James McBride, How Does the European Union Work?,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:00 AM EST), https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/how-does-european-union-work.
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judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal data are
being transferred.171
As of January 2022, the Commission has determined that fourteen countries
provide adequate protection.172 The United States is not one of them. 173
Absent an adequacy determination, businesses may transfer personal data
out of the EU through other legal means. The most commonly used method
is through Standard Contractual Clauses. 174 Standard Contractual Clauses
are Commission-approved contract provisions for use when businesses
transfer data to a third country or international organization that does not
provide adequate legal protection to personal data.175 Businesses that export
personal data from the EU can include these pre-approved clauses to
engage in cross-border data transfers to third countries and international
organizations that have not earned adequacy determinations. 176 A key
requirement of these Standard Contractual Clauses is that they allow
individuals to directly enforce their GDPR rights against both the
businesses transferring and receiving the personal data.177
But these pre-approved Standard Contractual Clauses are not without a
critical weakness: they are unable to prevent a third country’s government
from lawfully requesting access to the transferred personal data, including
requests related to national security. 178 So while the European Court of
Justice (“ECJ”) has upheld the validity of Standard Contractual Clauses, it
171. GDPR, supra note 162, art. 45(2)(a).
172. Adequacy Decisions: How the EU Determines If a Non-EU Country Has an
Adequate Level of Data Protection, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/lawtopic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2021).
173. See id. The European Union and United States had previously negotiated an
agreement called the Privacy Shield, under which thousands of small and medium-sized
enterprises could transfer data from the EU to the United States. See Nigel Cory et al.,
‘Schrems II’: What Invalidating the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Means for Transatlantic Trade
and Innovation, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., Dec. 2020, at 1 https://itif.org/sites/
default/files/2020-privacy-shield.pdf. But the European Court of Justice has since
invalidated the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield in its Schrems II decision, which means U.S.
businesses will likely turn to another GDPR mechanism for data transfers—standard
contractual clauses approved by the European Commission. Id. at 2.
174. NIGEL CORY ET AL., INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE ROLE AND VALUE OF
STANDARD CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES IN EU-U.S. DIGITAL TRADE 1 (Dec. 2020),
https://itif.org/sites/default/files/2020-standard-contractual-clauses.pdf.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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concluded that “[i]f compliance with the laws of the receiving country
requires the data importer to forego adequate protections regardless of the
safeguards in place, then ‘the controller or processor . . . [is] required to
suspend or end the transfer of personal data to the third country
concerned.’”179 The ECJ stated that to “ensure compliance with the level of
protection required under EU law,” the Standard Contractual Clauses may
require “supplementary measures.”180 The ECJ, however, did not define
supplementary measures.181 Thus, at least under the GDPR, the future of
Standard Contractual Clauses—and consequently all data transfers from the
EU to countries not included in the fourteen that the Commission has
deemed to provide adequate legal protection—is uncertain.182
While the workability and effects of the GDPR are still unfolding in the
ECJ and the global market, its robust protection of personal data has
inspired the adoption of similar data privacy laws in other countries. One
such law is the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) and its
amendment, the California Privacy Rights Act (“CPRA”).183 Other states,
including Oklahoma, have introduced bills that largely mirror the California
law but apply to different categories of businesses and provide different
levels of rights and protections for each state’s consumers.
2. State Data Privacy Approaches: California and Oklahoma
The California State Constitution recognizes privacy as an inalienable
right184 and is the only state constitution to do so. 185 This inalienable right to
privacy underpins the CCPA, which went into effect on January 1, 2020.186
The CCPA largely restricts businesses’ collection and sale of consumers’
“personal information.”187 The law currently applies to for-profit businesses
179. Id. at 6 (second alteration in original).
180. Id. at 6–7.
181. Id. at 6.
182. See Voss, supra note 170, at 516 (“[T]he use of standard contract clauses as an
appropriate safeguard has . . . come under attack.”).
183. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (West 2021) (incorporating Act of Oct.
11, 2019, ch. 757, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.110, 1798.115, 1798.120, 1798.125,
1798.130, 1798.140, 1798.145, 1798.150, 1798.185).
184. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
185. Mark Smith, Analysis: California Privacy Reboot Puts Rights in Spotlight,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 15, 2021, 9:05 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-lawanalysis/analysis-california-privacy-reboot-puts-rights-in-spotlight.
186. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (noting the effective date for
California Privacy Rights Act amendments as January 1, 2021).
187. FREEMAN, supra note 151, at 2.
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that satisfy one of three criteria: (1) earn more than $25 million in annual
gross revenue; (2) “[a]lone or in combination, annually buy[], receive[] for
the business’s commercial purposes, sell[], or share[] for commercial
purposes . . . the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers,
households, or devices”; or (3) “[d]erive[] 50 percent or more of [their]
annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information.”188 The
CCPA defines “consumers” as natural persons who are California
residents189 and “personal information” as “information that identifies,
relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or
could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular
consumer or household.”190
The CCPA, which is modelled after the GDPR, was “crafted to protect
individual privacy as a fundamental right.”191 The CCPA thus provides
California consumers with several rights, including (1) the “right to know,”
(2) the “right to opt out,” and (3) the “right to delete.” 192 The “right to
know” allows consumers to know the information that business have
collected about them during the past twelve months, the “right to opt out”
allows consumers to prevent businesses from selling their personal
information, and the “right to delete,” as the name implies, allows
consumers to request that a business delete any personal information it has
collected from them. 193 The CCPA also provides that a business may not
“discriminate against a consumer by ‘denying goods or services’ or by
‘charging different prices or rates’ to consumers who exercise their rights
under the CCPA.”194 Businesses must inform consumers about these rights

188. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1). With the passing of the CPRA, California
increased the requirement under § 1798.140(c)(1)(B) to 100,000 or more California
residents, and the covered personal information no longer includes “devices.” Stacey Gray et
al., California’s Prop 24, The “California Privacy Rights Act,” Passed. What’s Next?,
FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (Nov. 4, 2020), https://fpf.org/blog/californias-prop-24-the-californiaprivacy-rights-act-passed-whats-next/.
189. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g).
190. Id. § 1798.140(v)(1).
191. Catherine Barrett, Are the EU GDPR and the California CCPA Becoming the De
Facto Global Standards for Data Privacy and Protection?, SCITECH LAW., Spring 2019, at
24, 28.
192. FREEMAN, supra note 151, at 3.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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and provide methods to exercise these rights without cost.195 Unlike the
GDPR, however, the CCPA does not regulate cross-border data transfers.196
In November 2020, California passed the CPRA, which both modified
these rights under the CCPA and created new ones. 197 These modifications
to the CCPA include the following:
●

expanding the right to opt out of a sale to the right to opt out of a
sale or sharing of personal information;198

●

expanding the right to opt out to include opting out of
“automated decision-making technology”;199

●

expanding the right to know by eliminating the CCPA’s twelvemonth limitation; 200

●

expanding the right to delete to require service providers and
third parties to cooperate with businesses to delete personal
information; 201

●

creating a right for consumers to correct inaccurate personal
information about the consumer and requiring businesses to
inform consumers about this right; 202

●

creating a right for consumers to limit the sale or internal use of
“sensitive information,” which includes “information concerning

195. Id.
196. Carol A. F. Umhoefer, CCPA vs. GDPR: The Same, Only Different, DLA PIPER :
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/
publications/2019/04/ipt-news-q1-2019/ccpa-vs-gdpr/.
197. Gray et al., supra note 188; Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin, By Passing
Proposition 24, California Voters Up the Ante on Federal Privacy Law, BROOKINGS INST.:
TECHTANK (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/11/17/bypassing-proposition-24-california-voters-up-the-ante-on-federal-privacy-law/ (discussing the
ways in which the CPRA modified and expanded rights under the CCPA).
198. Gray et al., supra note 188.
199. Colleen Theresa Brown et al., California Privacy Law Overhaul – Proposition 24
Passes, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP: DATA MATTERS (Nov. 4, 2020), https://datamatters.sidley.com/
california-privacy-law-overhaul-proposition-24-passes.
200. Gray et al., supra note 188.
201. F. Paul Pittman & Kyle Levenberg, Before the Dust Settles: The California Privacy
Rights Act Ballot Initiative Modifies and Expands California Privacy Law, WHITE & CASE
(Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/dust-settles-californiaprivacy-rights-act-ballot-initiative-modifies-and.
202. Gray et al., supra note 188.
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orientation,

precise

creating a new data minimization and purpose requirement 204
that (1) limits businesses’ collection of personal information to
information that is reasonably necessary and proportionate to the
reasons the business collected the information and (2) prohibits
processing that information for a purpose incompatible with
those reasons.205

Most interestingly, the CPRA establishes the California Privacy
Protection Agency.206 The Agency has the authority to promulgate rules,
enforce the amended CCPA, and require businesses to conduct
cybersecurity audits and risk assessments for the Agency’s chief privacy
auditor to ensure compliance with the CPRA. 207 The Agency also plays a
broader educational role by promoting “public awareness and
understanding of the risks, rules, responsibilities, safeguards, and rights in
relation to the collection, use, sale and disclosure of personal
information.”208 Given California’s far-reaching impact on the global
technology market, the Agency will be a key privacy regulator around the
world.209
Since California passed the CCPA in 2018, multiple states have
proposed similar legislation to protect consumer data privacy. 210 Oklahoma
is one such state.211 Introduced in September of 2021,212 the Oklahoma
203. Id.
204. This provision mirrors the GDPR. See GDPR, supra note 162, recitals ¶¶ 49, 50
(limiting the processing of personal data to “the extent strictly necessary and proportionate
for the purposes of ensuring network and information security” and “for purposes other than
those for which the personal data were initially collected”).
205. Gray et al., supra note 188.
206. Pittman & Levenberg, supra note 201.
207. See id.
208. Lydia de la Torre & Glenn Brown, What Is the California Privacy Protection
Agency?, IAPP (Nov. 23, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/what-is-the-california-privacyprotection-agency/.
209. Id.
210. Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy Legislation Tracker, IAPP: RESOURCE CTR.
(Feb. 17, 2022), https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker/.
211. Oklahoma Computer Data Privacy Act of 2022, H.B. 2968, 58th Leg., 2d Sess.
(Okla. 2022).
212. David Stauss et al., 2022 Oklahoma Computer Data Privacy Act Filed, HUSCH
BLACKWELL: BYTE BACK (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.bytebacklaw.com/2021/09/2022oklahoma-computer-data-privacy-act-filed/.
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Computer Data Privacy Act of 2022 (“OCDPA”) would apply to certain
for-profit businesses that conduct business in the state, collect consumers’
personal information, and satisfy at least one of the following thresholds:
(1) receive $10 million in annual gross revenues; (2) receive the personal
information of twenty-five thousand consumers per year; or (3) derive at
least fifty percent of annual revenue from sharing personal information. 213
The Act defines a “consumer” as an Oklahoma resident 214 and “personal
information” as any information that “ identifies or could reasonably be
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer, household, or
consumer device.”215
Like the CCPA, 216 the OCDPA provides Oklahomans with the right to
know,217 the right to opt out,218 and the right to delete. 219 And like the
CPRA,220 the OCDPA creates a right to correct 221 and includes a data
minimization requirement that limits businesses to collecting and sharing
with third parties only personal information “that is reasonably necessary
to provide a good or service to a consumer who has requested the same
or is reasonably necessary for security purposes or fraud detection.” 222
Significantly, the “monetization of personal information shall never be
considered reasonably necessary for any purpose.”223 Unlike the CCPA,
however, the OCDPA does not define or provide a right to limit the use of
“sensitive personal information.”224
If passed, the Oklahoma law would provide residents with data privacy
rights similar to those under the CCPA and CPRA, but it would also further
complicate the existing patchwork of state laws that have sought to fill the
void of a federal data privacy framework. Importantly, state laws do not
213. Oklahoma Computer Data Privacy Act of 2022, H.B. 2968 § 3(3)(a). “Share” is
broadly defined as “renting, releasing, disclosing, disseminating, making available,
transferring, or otherwise communicating orally, in writing, or by electronic or other means,
a consumer’s personal information by the business to a third party for monetary or other
valuable consideration, or otherwise for a commercial purpose.” Id. § 3(17).
214. Id. § 3(6).
215. Id. § 3(13).
216. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
217. Oklahoma Computer Data Privacy Act of 2022, H.B. 2968 § 8.
218. Id. § 6(C).
219. Id. § 7(A).
220. See supra notes 202 and 205 and accompanying text.
221. Oklahoma Computer Data Privacy Act of 2022, H.B. 2968 § 9.
222. Id. § 6(A).
223. Id.
224. Compare id. § 3(13), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(ae).
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regulate international data transfers, and varying state laws contribute to
added compliance challenges for businesses that collect consumers’
personal information across different states, further illustrating the need for
a comprehensive U.S. federal law.
3. Recommendations for a U.S. Federal Data Privacy Law
The GDPR, CCPA, and the growing number of state privacy laws 225
have informed the debate in Congress over a U.S. federal data privacy law,
and the bills currently before the 117th Congress incorporate their
provisions to varying degrees. Many of the bills’ strengths lie in providing
strong, affirmative data privacy rights that largely mirror the rights
provided in the GDPR and CCPA/CPRA. But to adequately protect
Americans’ data privacy and reduce national security risks from foreign
companies operating in the United States, such as TikTok and WeChat, a
U.S. federal data privacy law will need to resist overly restricting crossborder data flow while protecting U.S. citizens’ personal data from foreign
governments when it leaves U.S. borders. Cross-border data flow is
“essential to economic growth in the digital age,” 226 but foreign
governments’ access to U.S. citizens’ data poses a national security risk. 227
A federal data privacy law must therefore strike a balance between these
competing interests, ensuring that cross-border data flow does not
jeopardize national security.
The data privacy bills before the 117th Congress provide an opportunity
for the United States to better protect consumers’ privacy and national
security interests. One such bill, the Information Transparency and Personal
Data Control Act, calls for the United States to “develop a balanced, high-

225. The Growth of State Privacy Legislation, IAPP: RESOURCE CTR. (Nov. 2021),
https://iapp.org/resources/article/the-growth-of-state-privacy-legislation-infographic/
(tracking the rapid growth of state privacy legislation from 2018 to 2021).
226. Joshua P. Meltzer & Peter Lovelock, Regulating for a Digital Economy:
Understanding the Importance of Cross-Border Data Flows in Asia, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar.
20, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/regulating-for-a-digital-economy-understand
ing-the-importance-of-cross-border-data-flows-in-asia/ (discussing the economic dangers of
data localization).
227. See Samm Sacks, Data Security and U.S.-China Tech Entanglement, LAWFARE
(Apr. 2, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/data-security-and-us-china-techentanglement (arguing for a “risk-based approach” to restricting access to U.S. personal
data); H. Jacqueline Brehmer, Note, Data Localization: The Unintended Consequences of
Privacy Litigation, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 927 (2018) (discussing the effects of data localization
on privacy and national security).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/7

2022]

COMMENTS

495

standard digital privacy framework that complements global standards.” 228
Providing affirmative data privacy rights similar to those under the GDPR
and CCPA/CPRA, the Act would give consumers the right to access and
correct personal data,229 provide opt-in and opt-out rights for certain
personal information, 230 and mandate “reasonable limits on the personal
data that companies collect and retain.” 231 The Act would also require
privacy audits every two years by a “qualified, objective, independent third
party.”232
Significantly, like the CPRA, the Information Transparency and Personal
Data Control Act defines certain categories of information as “sensitive
personal information.”233 The bill broadly defines “sensitive personal
information” to include information such as financial account numbers,
health information, genetic data, geolocation information, content of
personal communications, sexual orientation, religion, immigration status,
and browsing history. 234 The definition does not include de-identified
information, information related to employment, or publicly available
information. 235
Under the Information Transparency and Personal Data Control Act,
before an individual’s sensitive personal information may be “collected,
transmitted, stored, process[ed], sold, or otherwise shared” by a
controller,236 the individual must “provide affirmative, express consent.” 237
Consumers’ opt-in consent is thus a requirement for the collection and use
of all sensitive personal data, as well as for sharing sensitive personal
information with third parties. 238 While the bill broadly defines “third
parties,” it does not explicitly address data transfers to international
228. Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act, H.R. 1816, 117th Cong. §
2(1) (2021).
229. Id. § 2(6)(E).
230. Id. § 3(a)(1), (a)(4).
231. Id. § 2(6)(F).
232. Id. § 3(a)(6)(A)(i). There is an exemption for the audit requirements for businesses
that collect or use sensitive personal information for fewer than 250,000 individuals per
year. Id. § 3(a)(6)(C).
233. Id. § 7(9)(A).
234. Id.
235. Id. § 7(9)(B).
236. Id. § 3(a)(1)(A). A “controller” is a “person that, on its own or jointly with other
entities, determines the purposes and means of processing sensitive personal information.”
Id. § 7(5).
237. Id. § 3(a)(1)(A).
238. Id.
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corporate affiliates.239 For non-sensitive personal information, however, the
Information Transparency and Personal Data Control Act provides
consumers the right to opt-out of collection and use. 240
Another bill before the 117th Congress that provides strong consumer
data privacy rights is the Setting an American Framework to Ensure Data
Access, Transparency, and Accountability Act (“SAFE DATA Act”). 241
The requirements of the SAFE DATA Act would apply to any “covered
entity,” which the Act defines as “any person that is subject to the Federal
Trade Commission Act . . . ; collects, processes, or transfers covered data;
and determines the purposes and means of such collection, processing, or
transfer.”242 “Covered data” means any information “that identifies or is
linked or reasonably linkable to an individual or a device that is linked or
reasonably linkable to an individual.”243
Like the GDPR and CCPA/CPRA, the SAFE DATA Act would provide
consumers with affirmative data privacy rights: the rights to access,
correction, deletion, and data portability; 244 opt-in consent for the
processing or transfer of sensitive covered data;245 and opt-out consent for
non-sensitive covered data.246 The Act would also restrict covered entities
to the collection, processing, or transfer of covered data to what “is
reasonably necessary, proportionate, and limited to provide or improve a
product, service, or a communication about a product or service.”247 The
Act would require “large data holders” to conduct ongoing privacy impact
assessments,248 as well as require covered entities to “establish, implement,
239. Id. § 7(11). A “third party” is defined as “an individual or entity that uses or receives
sensitive personal information obtained by or on behalf of a controller.” Id.
240. Id. § 3(a)(4)(A).
241. Setting an American Framework to Ensure Data Access, Transparency, and
Accountability Act, S. 2499, 117th Cong. (2021).
242. Id. § 2(7).
243. Id. § 2(6)(A).
244. Id. § 103(a)(1)(A)–(C). The requirement to provide consumers with the right to
access, correction, deletion, and data portability would not apply to certain small businesses
that do not meet minimum thresholds. Id. § 108(c).
245. Id. § 104(a). The bill broadly defines “sensitive covered data,” which includes data
such as government-issued identification numbers, health data, financial account numbers,
biometric information, precise geolocation data, log-in credentials, and sexual orientation,
among others. Id. § 2(17).
246. Id. § 104(d).
247. Id. § 105(a)(1). The data minimization requirements would not apply to certain
small businesses that do not meet minimum thresholds. Id. § 108(c).
248. Id. § 107(a)–(b). A “large data holder” is a business that in one calendar year
processes or transfers (1) the non-sensitive data of more than eight million individuals or (2)
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and maintain reasonable administrative, technical, and physical data
security policies and practices to protect against risks to the confidentiality,
security, and integrity of covered data.”249 In addition, the SAFE DATA
Act would require covered entities to designate a “data privacy officer” and
a “data security officer” to monitor and ensure compliance with the Act. 250
While the Act would regulate the transfer of data to third parties, third
parties would not include entities that receive covered data from entities
“related to the covered entity by common ownership or corporate control”
and that “share common branding with the covered entity.” 251 Thus, the Act
would not regulate transfers to foreign-based corporate affiliates.
A third notable data privacy bill before Congress is the Data Protection
Act of 2021.252 Unlike other privacy bills, the Data Protection Act of 2021
does not enumerate specific data privacy rights. Rather, like the CPRA, the
Act would establish an independent agency—the “Data Protection
Agency”253—whose purpose would be “to protect individuals’ privacy,
prevent and remediate privacy harms, prevent, remediate, and reduce
discrimination on the basis of protected class through the processing of
personal information . . . , and limit the collection, processing, and sharing
of personal data.”254 The Data Protection Agency would be empowered to
issue rules, orders, and guidance necessary to carry out the Act and enforce
other federal privacy laws.255 Although the Data Protection Act of 2021
does not enumerate specific data privacy rights, the Data Protection Agency
would have authority to prescribe and enforce such rights to “protect[]
individuals and groups of individuals from privacy harms.” 256
If Congress were to enact any of the abovementioned bills, U.S.
consumers would enjoy data privacy rights resembling those under the
GDPR and the CCPA/CPRA, which would be a significant step toward
protecting data privacy in the United States. A shortcoming of these bills,
however, is that they do not explicitly address the privacy- and nationalsecurity-related issues of cross-border data transfers.

the sensitive data of more than three-hundred thousand individuals. Id. § 2(12).
249. Id. § 203(a).
250. Id. § 301(a)–(b).
251. Id. § 2(20).
252. Data Protection Act of 2021, S. 2134, 117th Cong. (2021).
253. Id. § 3(a).
254. Id. § 9(a).
255. Id. § 10(b).
256. Id. § 9(c)(5).
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The Adversarial Platform Prevention Act of 2021 (“APP Act”), 257 on the
other hand, is specifically designed to prevent cross-border data flow from
jeopardizing U.S. national security. The Act would require “high-risk
foreign software, like Chinese-owned TikTok and WeChat,” to comply
with certain data privacy standards to legally operate in the United States. 258
Specifically, the APP Act would apply to “software marketplace
operator[s]” and “owner[s] of covered foreign software.”259 “Software
marketplace operators” are persons who, “for a commercial purpose,
operate[] an online store or marketplace through which software is made
available for download by consumers in the United States,”260 and “covered
foreign software” includes software “owned or directly or indirectly
controlled” by a person that is organized, conducts its principal operations,
or is headquartered in a “covered country.”261 A “covered country” means
China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Venezuela, or Cuba, as
well as any country that the U.S. Secretary of State concludes has supported
international terrorism, or that by controlling “potentially dangerous
software poses an undue or unnecessary risk to the national security of the
United States or to the safety and security of United States persons.”262
Although the APP Act does not provide broad data privacy rights like
other bills before the 117th Congress, the Act would provide several data
privacy protections for U.S. consumers. First, the Act would require
software marketplace operators and owners of covered foreign software to
provide consumers with a pre-download “warning” that lists the names of
the software and software owner, as well as the country where the owner is
organized, headquartered, or operates.263 Second, the Act would require
owners of covered foreign software to ensure that parent companies could
not access U.S. consumer data through U.S.- or foreign-based
subsidiaries.264 Third, and most significantly, the APP Act would prevent
software marketplace operators and owners of covered foreign software
257. Adversarial Platform Prevention Act of 2021, S. 47, 117th Cong. (2021).
258. Press Release, Marco Rubio, U.S. Senate, Rubio Reintroduces Legislation to
Establish Standards and Restrictions for Chinese and Other High-Risk Foreign Apps (Jan.
26,
2021),
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/1/rubio-reintroduceslegislation-to-establish-standards-and-restrictions-for-chinese-and-other-high-risk-foreignapps.
259. Adversarial Platform Prevention Act of 2021, S. 47 § 2(a)(1).
260. Id. § 2(i)(7).
261. Id. § 2(i)(4)(A)–(B).
262. Id. § 2(i)(3)(A).
263. Id. § 2(a)(1)–(2).
264. Id. § 2(b)(2)(C).
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from using consumer data in a covered country, transferring consumer data
to a covered country, or storing consumer data outside the United States. 265
In addition, the Act would require owners of covered foreign software to
submit annual reports to the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S.
Attorney General that explain the type of data the owner collects, describe
their “data protection measure[s],” and list the number of data requests by
foreign governments and government entities, as well as how such requests
were handled. 266 If an owner of covered foreign software complies with a
request from a government in covered foreign country, the owner is barred
from collecting or storing data of any U.S. consumer through its covered
foreign software.267 Software marketplace operators and owners of covered
foreign software are subject to criminal penalties of $50,000 for each
knowing violation of the abovementioned data-protection measures.268
While the APP Act aggressively combats threats to data privacy and
national security by regulating cross-border data flow, the Act has some
glaring drawbacks. First, though other data privacy bills before Congress
specifically define consumer data and distinguish between sensitive and
non-sensitive data,269 the APP Act does neither; the Act presumably applies
to all consumer data, regardless of type and sensitivity level. Second, the
Act would not only restrict data transfers to foreign-based entities—it
specifies that owners of covered foreign software “may not share with, sell
to, or otherwise disclose to any other commercial entity the consumer data
of any person in the United States.”270 Rather than broadly prohibiting the
of transfer of any consumer data to any commercial entity, calibrating
transfer restrictions to the sensitivity level of consumer data would provide
a more balanced approach without sacrificing privacy or security.
Striking a balance between the economic risks of data localization and
the national security risks of foreign governments gaining access to U.S.
personal data is a complex but necessary challenge for a federal data
privacy law. Lawmakers should further debate and explore how to best
regulate cross-border data flows. This Comment recommends that a U.S.
federal data privacy law include the strong data privacy rights of bills like
the SAFE DATA Act, as well as provisions regulating cross-border data
265. Id. § 2(b)(3)(A).
266. Id. § 2(b)(1)(A).
267. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A).
268. Id. § 2(e)(1).
269. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text (Information Transparency and
Personal Data Control Act); see also supra notes 243–46 (SAFE DATA Act).
270. Adversarial Platform Prevention Act of 2021, S. 47 § 2(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
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flow, including between U.S.-based subsidiaries and their international
corporate affiliates. Furthermore, such a law should (1) establish an
independent agency that regulates cross-border data transfers to entities or
countries that do not afford adequate data protection and is empowered to
enter into data-protection agreements with those countries; (2) calibrate
transfer restrictions through risk-based assessments that consider the type,
use, and sensitivity level of consumer data;271 and (3) require companies to
conduct regular assessments regarding companies’ and receiving entities’
data protection compliance in cross-border transfers. The U.S. government
should further support these measures through the inclusion in trade
negotiations of cross-border data protection standards that would loosen
data localization policies while protecting data privacy and both countries’
national security.
Conclusion
The TikTok and WeChat debacle has illustrated IEEPA’s inability to
combat threats that foreign mobile applications pose to U.S. national
security and data privacy. Rather than one-off uses of IEEPA that target
individual foreign mobile applications, the United States should adopt a
comprehensive approach to protecting national security and privacy in the
form of a federal consumer data privacy law. Privacy is an internationally
recognized human right, and the U.N. human rights machinery has
indicated that this right extends to data privacy. 272 Furthermore, under the
UNGPs, the United States is required to pass legislation that protects
internationally recognized human rights.273 This legislation should provide
the strong data privacy rights of laws such as the GDPR and the
CCPA/CPRA, which would give consumers more control over their
personal information. Several of the bills before the 117th Congress would
provide for these rights. But to help prevent future TikTok and WeChat
scenarios, a federal data privacy law should also regulate cross-border data
271. See generally Sacks, supra note 227 (“The mere fact that a Chinese company
handles U.S. citizen data in and of itself may not necessarily warrant banning a transaction
or blacklisting a specific company. The U.S. national security risks should be evaluated
based on an investigation, with regular audits, to determine (a) what kind of U.S. citizen data
is being accessed (for example, metadata, images, geographic data, critical infrastructure
data), (b) how that data is being used and what data protection measures are in place to
protect the rights and interests of U.S. consumers, and (c) with whom that data is being
shared and through what mechanisms.”).
272. G.A. Res. 68/167, supra note 132.
273. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
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transfers based on the type and sensitivity level of consumer data. This is
where the current bills fall short.
In light of U.S. fears that foreign governments can obtain U.S. citizens’
personal information through foreign mobile applications, a federal
consumer data privacy law must provide a nuanced approach to crossborder data transfers that balances national security interests with the
harmful effects of data localization. Without such a federal law, the United
States will continue “playing a game of whack-a-mole” against an
increasing number of foreign technology companies. 274
Robert L. Rembert

274. Samm Sacks, Banning TikTok Is a Terrible Idea, SUPCHINA (July 16, 2020),
https://supchina.com/2020/07/16/banning-tiktok-is-a-terrible-idea/.
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